Abstract-In this paper, we consider transcripts which originated from a practical series of Turing's Imitation Game that was held on June 23, 2012, at Bletchley Park, U.K. In some cases, the tests involved a three-participant simultaneous comparison of two hidden entities, whereas others were the result of a direct two-participant interaction. Each of the transcripts considered here resulted in a human interrogator being fooled, by a machine, into concluding that they had been conversing with a human. Particular features of the conversation are highlighted, successful ploys on the part of each machine are discussed, and likely reasons for the interrogator being fooled are considered. Subsequent feedback from the interrogators involved is also included.
I. INTRODUCTION
T URING's imitation game [1] , also known as the Turing test, has become a pillar in the field of artificial intelligence and an integral part of every course of study on the subject. That said, there are those who question its worth, seeing it as AI's biggest blind alley unlikely "to produce useful products" and, hindering practical developments of AI [2] , or even regarding it as being harmful to the science of AI [3] . On the other hand, there are those who feel it is of major scientific importance and an important goal [4] and who believe "it offers a scientific approach to gathering evidence of machine thinking" [5] . It has even been used to see if computer game playing agents can imitate human players [6] .
Although it is of considerable interest as an imitation game in its own right, it also has an important role to play with regard to games in general. This is particularly true not only with regard to those games in which humanlike characters need to respond appropriately, but also where an avatar must develop a character with which a player can associate. To date, many games have merely involved visualizations and caricature-type avatars, but as games progress so complex behaviors will become more important, associated conversation will play an increasingly larger role, and the physical abilities and features involved in characterization will be directly related to communication that is integrally linked with the avatar. Furthermore, this conversation will need to be representative of the character and interwoven with its behaviors and emotional responses. Just as a player interacts in a physical sense with the character so they will wish to interact verbally. The character will need to appear to seamlessly understand and communicate in a human way. Therefore, in order to assess the state of play in this regard, this paper looks directly at the conversational abilities of AI systems in a Turing sense.
In this paper, we are not arguing that Turing's idea of examining machine versus human thinking, based on responses to any questions put by a human interrogator, is an operational test for intelligence. However, in line with Turing, we do agree that engineering a machine to think can help us to understand how it is that we humans think. We contend that practical Turing tests, infrequently conducted and adhering to conditions categorized by Turing himself, provide a corpus of "conversations between strangers" that provide an insight into what constitutes classification of a linguistic response as "satisfactory."
This paper focuses on responses deemed humanlike, such that hidden machines were classified as human in a series of Turing tests held at Bletchley Park on June 23, 2012 , to celebrate the 100th anniversary of Turing's birth. Prior to that, the previous series of recorded tests, run under strict conditions, was held at the University of Reading (Reading, U.K.) on October 12, 2008 . Subsequent reports on those tests showed how easily a human or a machine could be misclassified [7] , [8] .
Successful interrogators (in this paper, we use the words interrogator and judge interchangeably to mean the same thing) in 2008 identified three key features in distinguishing machine performance from that of a human in practical Turing tests: 1) speed of response; 2) length of response; 3) grammaticality.
In 2008, speed of response and length of response determined how Defeng Wu, one Turing test interrogator, classified hidden interlocutors in simultaneous tests: "if an entity replied very quickly with a long sentence it was more likely to be a machine" [9] . Daisy Johnson, another interrogator in the same series of tests reported that machines did not make spelling mistakes; "a fairly key signifier of humanness" [9] . This is in contrast to an earlier performance by one machine, Wallace's "Alice" in a 2004 Turing test contest, which was not as loquacious as the hidden humans [10] . In those tests, the machine was found to post fewer words overall per utterance than its human counterparts [10] . However, the performance of machines can be very good, at other times, to the extent that a human interrogator clearly and definitely believes the machine 1943-068X © 2013 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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to be human. This can lead to shock when the interrogator learns he has been fooled by a machine [8] .
When the 2012 series of tests was held, what we wished in particular to investigate was good machine performance. We wanted to look into the sort of ploys, tactics, and conversational abilities actually carried out by machines in practice that result in human interrogators ultimately misidentifying them as human. At the same time, we were aware that this would also involve consideration of the interrogators' methods to root out machines posing as humans.
In Section II, we introduce the tests held at Bletchley Park and give reasons for the structure imposed.
Following that, ten transcripts have been specifically selected as particular examples from those tests. In all ten cases, the hidden entity was a machine, yet at the end of each of these transcripts, the interrogator involved made a definite decision that he had been conversing with a human. There are many aspects of the tests that could be focused on, such as judge profiles (gender, age, previous experience), types of the test (either three-participant or two-participant), types of hidden machine, the ploys used, etc. We have selected these particular ten transcripts specifically to highlight some of the better machine performances in order for us to try to understand what is happening when machines do well. At the same time, we wished to ensure some diversity in the judges and machines involved.
In each case, we discuss the content of the transcripts and consider reasons for the misidentification. We then analyze some of the facts and figures that have arisen from the study and try to see what important features go into formulating the structure of a successful conversational bot. Finally, we draw some conclusions from the results obtained.
II. BLETCHLEY PARK TESTS
Modifying the practical setup at Reading University in October 2008, in which 96 simultaneous tests were carried out, in June 2012, both versions of Turing's imitation game were staged at Bletchley Park: 1) a three-participant test in which a human interrogates two hidden entities in parallel; and 2) a two-participant test in which a human interrogates one hidden entity at a time. (For a more detailed comparison of the tests, see [11] and [12] ). In each of the more than 150 tests conducted at Bletchley Park in 2012, the interrogators were asked to identify their hidden interlocutors.
If they were involved in interrogating two hidden interlocutors at the same time, the interrogators' task was to say whether they had received responses from one machine and one human, two machines, or two humans. If the interrogator had been involved in questioning one hidden entity directly, he was asked to say if it was a machine, or a human. In this paper, we are specifically concerned with successful machine performance in which human interrogators were, in each case, fooled into believing that the machine they had been conversing with was a human.
Turing described the imitation game as follows: "The idea of the test is that a machine has to try and pretend to be a man, by answering questions put to it, and it will only pass if the pretence is reasonably convincing. A considerable portion of a jury, who should not be expert about machines, must be taken in by the pretence" [13] .
The Turing imitation game involves a machine which pretends to be a human in terms of conversational abilities. Turing himself pointed out: "The game may be criticized because the odds are weighted too heavily against the machine" [1] . The right identification would mean that a judge decided correctly at the end of a paired conversation which was the machine and which was the human. In this paper, therefore, we are only concerned with when a judge not only did not make the right identification but rather made a wrong identification by identifying a machine as a human. We are not, however, interested here with cases in which a judge mistakes a human for a machine. This phenomenon, known as the confederate effect [14] , has been discussed elsewhere [8] , [15] .
To strictly conform to Turing's original wording in his 1950 paper [1] , we refer here to 5-min-long tests only. We are aware that there are those who take issue over suitable timing [16] , but this is not an argument for this paper. In the tests carried out, there was a hard cutoff at the end of each discourse and no partial sentences were transmitted. Once a sentence had been transmitted, it could not be altered or retracted in any way.
What this paper does is to present ten specific transcripts selected from a day of actual, practical Turing tests (from over 150 transcripts in total). These were held under strictly timed conditions, with many external viewers, at Bletchley Park on June 23, 2012; the same place as that at which, during World War II, Turing led a team of code breakers who cracked the German Enigma machine cypher [17] . Five different machines took part in the tests during the day, alongside 25 hidden humans. Thirty different judges compared these machines' conversational abilities against the humans.
In the tests, the hidden humans were asked merely to be themselves, humans, although they were requested not to give away their specific identity or personal information. They were not given any incentive to behave in any particular way. Of course, this did not prevent any human from giving false information, which is something that humans do frequently. The tests were "unrestricted conversations," which meant the judge could ask anything or introduce any topic within the boundaries of courtesy (the judges had been informed that there may be children among the hidden human entities).
There were five separate sessions at different times throughout the day, with six parallel imitation games occurring during each session. A different judge was required for each game, which meant there were six judges in each session. Each hidden human took part in five of the games in a session. Judges and hidden humans all took part in one session only. All five machines (the five different competition bots), however, completed throughout the day. In this way, each machine was involved in six games per session, hence 30 games in total in the day.
To explain this further, in any given session, a judge would conduct six separate tests. In the first, the judge might witness a hidden human pitted against a hidden machine. Of course, the judge would not know this; he/she would simply be aware of two hidden entities and have to make his/her own decision on the nature of the entities. The second test might then involve a single hidden human, although again the judge would not be aware of the entity's nature. The third test might then involve two hidden machines, which the judge would attempt to classify. This would go on until the judge had conducted all six tests in that session.
By the end of the session, an individual judge would have had the opportunity to experience a discourse with all five of the machines (competition bots) present and with all the five hidden humans operational during that session. But the judge only discoursed once with each of the different machines and each of the hidden humans. This arrangement also occurred, in a different order, for the other five judges taking part in that session.
What we focus on here is not only how good the machines were at deception, but also how the deception was possibly achieved in each case. Some of this will, of course, be a case of guess work as we are trying to understand the workings of each judge's brain. However, the conclusions may lead to potential strategies for machine designers to employ, and second, they perhaps indicate questioning methods to avoid if judges do not wish to be fooled by a machine. Subsequently, we have obtained significant feedback from the judges involved in which they assess their decisions in hindsight and, in some cases, give something of an explanation as to what they were thinking about at the time.
In Section III, ten separate transcripts are listed exactly as they occurred. These represent actual transcripts taken, in each case, at the actual U.K. time that they occurred, on the morning and afternoon of June 23, 2012 . Where feedback from the judges has been received post-event, these are included for the relevant interaction; for others, the authors have given their interpretation of the conversation along with an indication of any points they believe to be pertinent to the decision made by the relevant interrogator. It may well be that the reader has his/her own point of view and a different interpretation of the results.
III. SUCCESSFUL MACHINE PLOYS
Each of the entities in the transcripts which follow is a machine playing the role of the hidden interlocutor. Judges came from a variety of backgrounds (adults and teenagers, those with prior knowledge of the Turing test, and others without). At the end of each conversation, the judge incorrectly decided that the hidden entity was a human. No transcripts involving a hidden human or containing unsuccessful machine performance are included here.
At the end of each conversation, the judge could see the entire transcript before making his decision. In each case, he was definite that the hidden entity was a human whereas, in reality, in each case, it was a machine. Each of the transcripts details a different human-machine pairing. All wording and spelling are exactly as at the time-any spelling mistakes are those which actually occurred in the test. Before we discuss the conversations, we give readers a chance to decide for themselves the nature of the entity that each judge is talking to. [18] , which sent utterances to the left of the judge's computer monitor (meanwhile a hidden human sent replies with messages appearing in a box on the right of the judge's computer screen). The hidden human was recognized as human, although Elbot, a machine, was also classified as a human. However, at the end of this conversation, in the case of the machine, the judge openly stated that not only had she been conversing with a human but that she was sure the person was a native English speaking, teenage, male.
In hindsight, it is not difficult to see why. The first line uttered by the entity is a little strange, but it is its third line which is masterly. In response to the judge's comment about laughing, the entity takes control of the conversation by offering to tell a joke, which it subsequently does. The judge probably linked the subsequent humor to a hidden person. Then, later when the judge mentions a chicken, the entity correctly follows up on this with a suitable response and then once again takes control of the conversation by asking the judge a pertinent question, given the way the conversation was going, about chickens. So "understanding" what the key issue is on a couple of occasions and actually taking control of the conversation were sufficient here for the deception to occur.
Elbot's double bluff of pretending to be a human who is in turn pretending to be a machine has proven to be very successful on many occasions [7] , [8] . However, the point is that it must be set in the context of appropriate responses throughout the discourse. It is merely trying to convince the judge into believing that it is human. Clearly it worked well here as that is exactly what the judge concluded, also considering the machine to be male rather than female and so on.
Transcript 2. In this conversation, the adult male judge interacted in a one-to-one test. He conversed with machine JFred [19] . This judge had prior experience: before taking part in this imitation game he had previously interacted with a machine (Ikea's Anna, virtual customer service agent). Post-event, this judge, a journalist by profession, reported the following about his conversation: "I must admit, given the time constraints, it was really hard to say. The conversation sounded quite 'random,' but whether that was a poorly performing chatbot or a bored or distracted or disinterested human is hard to say. I would probably go with 'undecided,' if that was one of the choices. (That is, I wouldn't go so far as to say that the entity 'convinced' me that it was a human; it's really just a hunch at this point.) (My favorite analogy is the visual one: A good long look at a humanoid figure is probably enough to determine whether it is a person or a department store mannequin-but 1/10 of a second probably isn't. A mannequin can 'pass the visual Turing test' if the time limit is brief enough.) I suppose if I had to choose, I might go with an adult male native English speaker. But only if there was no 'undecided' option."
The unsure option was available to judges and clearly visible on their score sheet [20] . However, once again the hidden machine entity was identified as definitely being a native English speaking male at the end of the conversation. The conversation did not start well though for the machine in this case. In their third response, the mention of both wi-fi and pub seemed slightly out of context. But they got it back on track very positively with the Monty Python humorous link between 5-min Turing tests and a comedy sketch about the Argument clinic, quote "Is this a 5-min argument or the full half hour?" Then, in response to the Beatles question, a direct answer is not given but the music link remains as the conversation shifted slightly.
The entity then appeared to show in depth knowledge about a pop group named Dread the Fear, which probably convinced the judge who did not have such knowledge. The authors have subsequently searched and been unable to find reference to such a group or to Steve Henderson; however, even now we cannot be sure that the machine was not correct on this point. Importantly, the entity was very convincing in giving a plausible response.
Transcript 3. In this conversation, the judge, a male medical science professor and clinician, like the female judge in Transcript 1, had no previous knowledge of chatting with artificial agents. The conversation in Transcript 3 took place during a simultaneous test in which the machine, Eugene Goostman [21] , sending messages to the right of the judge's screen, was considered a male, adult, native English speaker.
The judge was rather slow to get going here, and hence, this was a relatively short conversation. In fact, the machine responded reasonably appropriately to each point raised by the interrogator. The entity did steer the conversation slightly on each occasion and even threw in a humorous comment about a guinea pig. The reference to a chatter bot could have been a give away, but this was not spotted by the interrogator. The entity even concluded by taking over the conversation and asked the interrogator a question. This judge also misclassified the hidden human (male, adult native English speaker) against which machine Eugene Goostman was compared, as a machine scoring it with 35/100 for conversation ability.
Transcript 4. In this conversation, a male adult judge was involved in a machine-machine control pairing. The judge correctly identified the machine sending messages to the left of the screen as being a machine; however, the machine on the right, Cleverbot [22] , was classified as a human male, teenage native English speaker. Post-event, the judge reported this: "Interesting reading back over it. On balance, I felt it was a person trying too hard to be like a machine that's not understanding what I was typing that would be my hunch." This is a difficult one to analyze. It may well be a surprise to some that, at the end of the conversation, the interrogator was absolutely certain that he had been conversing with a human; however, that is the case. In fact, the conversation comes over as something of an argument with quick one line responses. Anyone who has had teenage children may well remember conversations of this sort on occasion though. While the entity did say some off-track things, e.g., mentioning Jose and singing, conversely the way he drew the interrogator off the topic of the argument probably was the main convincing point. Indeed, this is a ploy taken by some humans in that they will take the subject of the conversation elsewhere to avoid a sticky issue. Interestingly, the entity in Transcript 3 only gave four responses in total, whereas in this transcript the entity gave 12 responses, yet both were exactly 5-min conversations.
One interesting element is the entity's comment, "This was a triumph," which appears somewhat unconnected to the rest of the discourse. This is, in fact, taken from the first line in the song "Still Alive," on the Portal soundtrack. The expression is used typically as a reference to the game Portal when commenting on Portal-related news. Looking at the transcript though, it is not clear that the judge was at all aware of the reference.
Overall, this is one transcript where it might be difficult to understand how a judge could possibly come to the decision he did. The machine-machine pairing indeed might have helped with the deception, although judges were aware that such a pairing was possible. It is an interesting feature of the game, however, that judges are human and humans make some stupid decisions which, at the time, they feel are perfectly sensible. Indeed, it may well be that they do not realize they have made an error of judgement. It is the machine's role to assist them in coming to an erroneous conclusion.
Transcript 5. In this conversation, a female teenage judge was interacting with two machines in a control simultaneous test. Though the machine on the right was correctly classified, JFred [19] was incorrectly classified as a male child, native English speaker. Here, even though the conversation seemed strange at times, there appeared to emerge quite a close relationship between the interrogator and the entity, to the extent that the interrogator sent the entity a couple of kisses.
At first, there was a bit of a tit-for-tat argument, but it was possibly the final few lines that sealed the decision in that the entity was able to apparently link Danny Vidon as being an actor and stay on subject with reference to a Sci-Fi film. For the record, there is indeed a Sci-Fi film entitled Marooned. Again there is quite a bit of material in this conversation, with the entity giving a total of 14 responses, the highest number in all of the ten transcripts considered in this paper.
Transcript 6. The same female teenage judge in conversation 5 was the judge involved in Transcript 6. In this conversation, the teenage judge interacted with two hidden interlocutors simultaneously, a human on the left (which was misclassified by the judge as being a machine), and a machine, Eugene Goostman [21] , sending messages to the right of the judge screen. The opening by the entity may well have convinced the interrogator here from the start.
The first few lines were all about Eminem, which the interrogator appeared to be interested in. It is an intriguing aspect of human communication that if someone else shows some interest in what you are interested in, then you often look more favorably on that person. Some of the later statements by the entity were off the mark though, e.g., the guinea pig reference and not answering the question as to where it was from, then saying it did not get the question. However, these points seem to have been forgiven by the interrogator, perhaps because of the earlier camaraderie with regard to music.
One particular line by the entity is of interest: "Eminem is a famous crapper. No, raper. ripper Yeah, I mean-rapper." Messages were only seen by the interlocutor once the return/ enter key had been pressed. So, although it may, at first, seem strange that someone would knowingly make a mistake and then correct it by further typing, as opposed to deleting the mistake and rewriting, that is exactly what happened here. This, therefore, must be regarded as quite a clever ploy on the part of the machine.
Transcript 7. In this conversation, a male adult judge interacted in a simultaneous test with a human on the left (correctly recognized as human), and Eugene Goostman, on the right. Eugene Goostman was misclassified as a male teenager, native English speaker. This judge provided extensive feedback postevent on how he arrived at classifying his right hidden conversational partner as a machine: "[16:06:31] Judge: Hi there, do you prefer to wear a dress or trousers to work? + I wanted to work in the greeting for politeness and two questions to give the entity a complex question to answer. The question was designed to find out whether the entity was male or female by inference and to determine whether the entity was a child or adult. [16:10:04] Entity: No, I haven't seen it, unfortunately. But I hope it is better than these crappy Star Wars. And I forgot to ask you where you are from + The entity has confused TV with film. The word 'these' used instead of 'those' present tense when past tense was correct. But it did come back with another question and used an ellipsis instead of a question mark. That is human like and I do it in e-mails all the time " This was quite a short conversation which seemed to be largely due to the interrogator taking almost a minute to respond on several occasions. So, in this case, there were only five responses by the entity, which was, in fact, the machine which pretends to be Eugene, a 13-year-old Ukrainian boy. In fact, three of the five responses from the entity were based on themselves asking the interrogator a question as opposed to responding to the point originally made by the interrogator.
This might be sees as a case of the machine entity fooling the judge by means of some cheap tricks. As far as the game is concerned, there is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, if they are the sort of cheap tricks that humans use, then they may well add to the deception. Changing the topic and being rude are ploys that humans use in human-human communication. Therefore, the game also serves as some sort of analyzer for humans. If a machine is pretending to be human, then it makes us ask: What does it mean to be a human?
Humans are easily distracted and allow the subject to be changed directly, which is exactly what happened here. It is only in the case of the word "manager" that the question asked by the machine is at all connected with the original question faced. The first instance was perhaps the best example in that, when asked about a film, the response was to completely ignore the question and ask the interrogator about their profession. The ploy worked though.
Transcript 8. In this conversation, a male adult judge interacted in a one-to-one direct test with machine Eugene Goostman [21] . The machine was misclassified as a human female, child, nonnative English speaker. So here we witness Eugene again, this time with a different interrogator. In this case, the conversation started a little scrappily but settled down on the topic of occupation.
Eugene then answered some direct questions well but some of the later responses were off target. In the line "I come from Manchester. Did you see the jubilee?" the response from the machine was to ignore the question and to instead focus on the word "Manchester," thereby an attempt was made to redirect the subject of the conversation. In this case, however, the interrogator did not go along with it but rather asked his question again. However, the machine appeared to be even more stubborn than the interrogator and once more attempted to change the subject, which it succeeded in doing; a sort of power play in action.
Transcript 9. In this conversation, the same female judge from Transcript 1 interacted in a simultaneous test with a human, who they correctly identified, sending messages to the left, and a machine, Cleverbot [22] , which she misclassified as being a human nonnative English speaker. The conversation consisted of six question-and-response pairs. In three of these, the machine gave a reasonable answer, e.g., "what color do you like?"; answer "blue." However, the machine did give exactly the same response to sentences in which the word "sun" appeared, in both cases misunderstanding this as a reference to the computer workstation and hence software package Java. But in the first and last lines the machine responded directly and appropriately to questions and this is probably what sealed the interrogator's decision.
It is interesting that in this case the judge appears to have overlooked a pointer to a URL turning up in the conversation, which to someone heavily involved in computing might be regarded as a giveaway. However, Turing specifically spoke of "average interrogators" [1] , and in organizing the game, considerable effort was expanded to spread the judge base. This particular judge was certainly computer literate, using one daily, but not to the extent of being an expert. It must be remembered though that Turing never anticipated the game to be played by expert judges.
Transcript 10. In the last conversation presented in this paper, we again found the female adult judge from Transcripts 1 and 9 misclassifying a machine. In the conversation in Transcript 10 this judge interacted with two hidden entities in parallel; both were machines in a control test. The machine to the left, Eugene Goostman, was misclassified as a human, male adult native English speaker.
Again, we can see here the evidently successful ploy of not answering the question posed but rather attempting to change the subject by asking another question. The third response of the machine does seem a little off, however, in that it completely ignored the question about origin. The final line is a good example though of responding to a question in an argumentative tone, in a way similar to that which was employed in Transcript 4.
V. WHAT IS IN A BOT?
It is pertinent to ask what exactly goes into the type of bot employed in this game. In many ways, the five machines involved exhibit a deal of commonality. Many of the languages and technical aspects have been discussed at length elsewhere; see, e.g., [23] . Where they differ is perhaps in the personalities created and the heuristical aspects of each character's make up.
First, the bot has to have a certain amount of encyclopedia style common knowledge; at least some basic and topical knowledge that any human might be reasonably expected to hold. Second, a certain amount of behavioral knowledge is needed for discussion and to ensure reasonable, contextual replies. But perhaps most important is knowledge that the bot collects about itself, its character, its ego. In many of the transcripts, it can be seen that the bot stamps its own personality on the discourse and it is simply this force of personality that makes all the difference.
The important features of bot development have perhaps been best summarized by Demchenko and Veselov, creators of Eugene. They said in [23] that "you don't write a program, you write a novel. You think up a life for your character from scratch-starting with childhood-endowing him with opinions, thoughts, fears, quirks." It is a combination of these attributes that, when they gel, make a conversation believable as a human conversation because the judge believes in the character behind it.
Each of the bots involved is different in many ways. One of them, Elbot, is a result of research and development, from Artificial Solutions [18] who develop interactive customer service assistants. Such systems are designed to increase online product sales while reducing customer service costs. Created by Fred Roberts, Elbot's character, purpose and response system is designed to cover a well-defined and self-contained scope of inputs, essentially a set of frequently asked questions [8] .
Elbot's responses are based on schemata, designed to recognize classes of inputs in all their variations and to associate them with a desired response with respect to contextual information. Elbot has been described by Roberts as "sarcastic," with "various techniques" including several social psychological theories which assist in simulating human dialog techniques, including "safety-net," "preventative-answering," "features and Easter eggs," and "luck" [8] .
It is noticeable, however, that in this particular series of tests, Eugene was very successful in fooling different judges in different ways. Looking through the transcripts in which Eugene was involved, we can see a number of repeated ploys, which are summarized as: try to reply on topic, change the subject if possible, even asking questions, steer the conversation, occasionally throw in some humor, show some topical (possibly offbeat) knowledge, and use some textual tricks such as correcting errors. While these observations clearly do not define Eugene's performance in any way, they do indicate some of the ploys used.
VI. SUPPORTING INFORMATION
What we attempt to do in this section is to deal as best we can with the numerous questions that may arise as a result of this work, from the data collected.
The success rates for the machines involved in terms of the percentage of cases in which a judge did not make the right identification and classify them definitely as a machine were:
• Eugene Goostman: 28%;
• Elbot: 23%;
• JFred: 23%;
• Cleverbot: 17%;
• Ultra Hal: 0%.
Various transcripts for each of the machines scoring nonzero were included in this paper in order for the comparison of strategies to be made.
A wide variety of judges and hidden humans were involved in the tests, both young and old, male and female, etc., as we were attempting to aim for Turing's statement concerning "average interrogators" [1] . The ploys and strategies of the machines were applicable to all judges, however, and machines did not exhibit different strategies for different judges, other than those which came out in the conversation. There were some gender issues but these are not a subject for this paper; indeed, they are part of ongoing research.
There was little/no difference between the average length of conversations in which a judge identified the entities correctly, a machine was misidentified as a human, or a human was misidentified as a machine. It appears that the content rather than the amount is critical, given the 5-min cutoff. Although two judges classified all their entities correctly, when judges did make errors, these were quite varied and certainly not prolific enough for us to conclude that certain types of judges make certain types of misclassifications, other than in terms of gender.
All 30 judges experienced discourse with each of the five machines and with five different hidden humans. Twelve judges identified all machines correctly, 11 judges made one machine mistake, five judges made two such mistakes, and two judges made three such mistakes. Meanwhile, only five judges identified all humans correctly, 12 judges made one human mistake, nine judges made two such mistakes, and four judges made three such mistakes. The highest total number of mistakes by any judge was five (three machine and two human) and the lowest total was zero mistakes, which was achieved by one judge. The average number of mistakes per judge was 2.3 (out of a total of ten trials in each case).
While this paper has looked specifically at cases in which machines have been misidentified as humans, the converse case of humans being misidentified as machines is also of interest, although for very different reasons. Such cases are looked at in depth elsewhere [15] . It must be remembered that humans are all very different, and may exhibit spontaneity, draw interesting relationships, may try to provoke, or to control the discourse, and use language, examples, or knowledge that a judge may not understand. All these features are likely to assist in a human being misidentified as a machine and are completely different characteristics to those we have looked at in this paper, where machines are, arguably, attempting to do quite the opposite.
VII. CONCLUSION
Agents that exhibit humanlike conversational capabilities will contribute considerably to the believability of game characters in the future. But whereas human players appear to be happy to interact with an avatar that is physically more of a human caricature, it is our opinion that, when it comes to communication, this will have to be much more humanlike, involving all aspects of discourse, including apparent understanding, relevance, humor, believability, context, and creativity. Turing's imitation game will, therefore, take on a vitally important role as this technology is developed.
Developers of machines for practical Turing tests have published some indication of their strategies on how to convince judges they are interacting with a human [23] . Most judges in the Bletchley Park tests were successful at identifying the machines; indeed, only one of the 30 judges was successful in correctly identifying all their hidden conversational partners. Conversely, in this paper, we have presented ten transcripts involving seven of those 30 judges who erred due to their own particular, subjective opinion on what constitutes a satisfactory response to an input.
Essentially it was the variety of responses given by the machines that governed our selection of transcripts. If we had included all the transcripts in which machines fooled the judges, there would have been quite a few where it is very difficult to see how any judge could possibly have been fooled. We also omitted those transcripts that showed the same ploy, and similar conversation, on the part of the same machine. It is just unfortunate that our attempt to provide diversity has led to one judge in particular being featured on three occasions.
A key feature of the Turing imitation game is not whether a machine gives a correct or incorrect response, or indeed a truthful or untruthful one, but rather if it gives the sort of response that a human might give, such that an interrogator cannot tell the difference [24] . One ploy by machines that we witnessed here on several occasions was that of not answering a question but rather attempting to steer the conversation by changing the subject [25] . This was achieved in Transcript 8: even when the interrogator asked his question again, the machine dug their heels in (so to speak), persisted, and got away with it. On a few occasions, a question was avoided by the machine displaying an argumentative gambit. This is a technique that often works well in everyday human life and clearly has had a dramatically positive effect here.
One of the aspects which we specifically sought out was the success/failure rate of judges when involved in a three-participant test as opposed to a two-participant test. Results from our studies here were inconclusive one way or the other, and hence this is something which we wish to follow up on in subsequent studies. It may be that, perhaps surprisingly, it makes little difference.
While this paper selected only ten transcripts from seven of the 30 judges in total, it should not be concluded that the remaining 23 judges were perfect. On several occasions, a judge decided that a hidden human was a machine; at other times, a judge was simply unsure about a discourse; and at times, a machine was considered to be human. After much consideration on our part, we have had considerable difficulty in understanding why certain decisions were made. What we have presented here are cases in which a machine was definitely considered to be human and where we have logically been able to unravel some of the thought processes involved.
In terms of future applications for this kind of technology, especially in the context of games, humanlike interaction is likely to become an increasingly important issue. Many gamers spend a lot of time in games, such that they become very sensitive to stupid behavior. Presently, such observations are based mainly on movement patterns, but when AI provides the conversation in games, then it will be more a case of fooling "expert" judges. To adhere strictly to Turing's wording, we have focused here, as best we could, on "average interrogators" [1] , [13] and have included a wide variety of people. It will be interesting subsequently to see how such machines perform when taken to task only by experts.
In real life, conversations tend to have a purpose and strangers are not interrogated without reason. In fact, restricting the game to a role-playing exercise can, in general, make it easier for the machine to fool an interrogator [7] , where chatbots are essentially actors that conform to a character description and stay on topic. What we have presented here are the results of discourses on unlimited topics. It may be, however, that the restricted version of the test is more suited to the gaming environment.
One aspect of the Turing imitation game, and it is merely one aspect, is a consideration of how well machines can converse with a human in comparison with a human conversing with another human. Another important issue, however, is that in studying successful machine ploys, it opens a window onto the fundamental nature of human communication, unpicking some of its flaws and nuances in a rather annoying way.
Trying to pick out rules for successful machine ploys can be frustrating though. It could be said that exhibiting just a little bit of opinionated knowledge of popular culture might go a long way with human judges, such as the Eminem (Transcript 6) and Britney Spears (Transcript 3) examples. Such emotional looking reactions might make the machines seem to be more human. Perhaps the best example of this was the Dread the Fear reference (Transcript 2). However, with popular culture, one must tread carefully in case the judge misses the reference completely as seems to be the case in the Portal, "This was a Triumph" reference (Transcript 4).
A key point of Turing's deliberation, and the game, was to examine whether machines could think: Turing said in 1950, "Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played ?" Such a question replaces our original, "Can machines think?" This is a philosophical question which has been much discussed and which we can barely scratch the surface of here.
However, it must be said that in this paper we have put forward a collection of machine discourses, and no matter what we think of the quality of those discourses ourselves, the human judge in each case decided that the hidden entity was definitely a human. Implicit in that conclusion, via the game, is that the hidden entity can think. On the other hand, such a decision has merely been made based on a brief conversation, and it could easily be argued to be no more than "if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck then it is a duck" [26] . If nothing more, the game certainly fuels the philosophical argument.
Not only is the Turing imitation game an important benchmark in terms of one aspect of AI and its philosophy, but it also paints an important picture of the trusting and relatively reactive way in which humans communicate, thereby highlighting some of its inadequacies.
